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Abstract: This section provides an overview of cases in front of the Court of Justice
of the European Union concerning contract law. The present issue covers the
period between the beginning of July 2015 and the end of April 2016.
General Law of Contract and Obligations
Lack of conformity which became apparent within six months of
delivery of the goods: Judgment in Case C-497/13 Faber1
Thepresent caseconcernsakeyprovisionofEuropeanconsumerprotection legisla-
tion. On 27 May 2008, Ms Farber bought a used car at the Dutch Hazet garage. On
26 September 2008, while she was travelling to a business meeting, the car caught
fire and completely burned down. It was towed to Hazet garage and eventually
movedtoascrapyardwhere itwasscrappedshortlyafter.Therefore, theexact cause
of the firewasnot determined. By letter of 11May 2009,MsFarber notified theHazet
garage that she was holding it liable for the destruction of the car and of various
personal objectswhichhad travelled in the car. In the ensuing trial, the court of first
instance did not bother to determine whether Ms Farber had purchased the car in
her capacity as a consumer. The court of appeals referred the case to the CJEU.
Against this factual background, the judgment addressed three main questions,
all relating to different procedural aspects of the enforcement of consumer rights.
First, the CJEU confirmed that the principles of equivalence and effectiveness
shape the national courts’ decision on whether to investigate ex officio whether a
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contract was concluded by a consumer; this is relevant whenever that status is
doubtful in view of the facts brought forward by the parties. The principle of
effectiveness has even greater impact. If domestic procedural rules bar the court
from classifying the party as either ‘consumer’ or ‘non-consumer’, it demands that
the court nevertheless proceed to that classification if the court has the relevant
facts at its disposal or can ascertain them by making a simple request for clarifica-
tion. This consequence of the effectiveness principle holds even when the party is
represented by a lawyer in the specific case. The CJEU added that rules relating to
the burden of proof regarding lack of conformity, such as Article 5(3) of Directive
1999/44, must be applied by national courts of their own motion. It is this proof of
lack of conformity with which the remainder of the judgment deals.
Thus, second, the CJEU unsurprisingly held that Article 5(2) of Directive 1999/
44 does not preclude a national rule which provides that the consumer must
inform the seller of the lack of conformity in good time lest he lose his rights
derived from the directive. The period of notification may not be less than two
months from the date on which the consumer detected the lack of conformity.
Article 5(2) of Directive 1999/44 grants Member States precisely the power to
introduce such rules. The only detail the CJEU added is that the notification need
only relate to the existence of the lack of conformity and that it may not be subject
to rules of evidence which would make it excessively difficult for the consumer to
exercise his rights.
Third and finally, the Court addressed perhaps the most important question
of the case: the exact scope of the reversal of burden of proof contained in Article
5(3) of Directive 1999/44 (six months rule). If the lack of conformity becomes
apparent within six months of delivery of the goods, Article 5(3) states that,
notwithstanding some exceptions, the lack of conformity is presumed to have
existed at the moment of delivery. The CJEU held that the ‘consumer is required to
prove only that the lack of conformity exists’, being ‘not required to prove the
cause of that lack of conformity or to establish that its origin is attributable to the
seller’ (para 70). Furthermore, the consumer must prove that the lack of confor-
mity became physically apparent within six months of delivery of the goods. As a
consequence, the burden shifts to the seller to prove that the cause of the lack of
conformity can be found in an act or omission which took place after delivery.
Termination of the agency contract by the principal and
compensation of the agent: Judgment in Case C-338/14 Quenon
The plaintiff of the main proceedings, Quenon, acted both as a commercial agent
for Citibank, selling banking products, and as an insurance agent for Citilife,
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selling insurance products. In January 2004, Citibank terminated its agency
contract and paid both a termination indemnity and a goodwill indemnity. As a
result of that termination, Quenon lost access to the data bank it used to manage
the portfolio of Citilife insurance products, making it de facto impossible for
Quenon to continue to perform the insurance agency contract. In the ensuing
trial, Quenon demanded from Citibank and Citilife, jointly or severally, to pay an
indemnity regarding the insurance agency contract and supplementary damages.
The defendants claimed that Article 17(2) of the Sales Agents Directive 86/653/
EEC prevents the simultaneous award of an indemnity and damages.
Against this factual background, the judgment addressed two main ques-
tions.
First, the CJEU held that Article 17(2) of Directive 86/653/EEC does not
preclude national legislation enabling the sales agent to seek simultaneous
compensation, on termination of an agency contract, both through an indemnity
and through additional damages, provided that this does not result in the agent
being compensated twice for the loss of commission. The Court argued that
Article 17(1) of Directive 86/653/EEC has Member States choose between two
varieties of compensation: either an indemnity according to Article 17(2) of
Directive 86/653/EEC or damages according to Article 17(3) of Directive 86/653/
EEC. The Belgian law applicable in this case provided for a mixture of both: it first
opts for the indemnity variety, but allows agents to recover additional damages
for the amount in which actual damages exceed the indemnity they are entitled
to. At first glance, this seems to contradict the dichotomy inherent in Article 17 of
Directive 86/653/EEC. However, the CJEU convincingly argued that Article 17(2)(c)
of Directive 86/653/EEC clearly speaks against the mutual exclusivity of indem-
nity and damages by providing that the ‘grant of such an indemnity shall not
prevent the commercial agent from seeking damages.’ These damages, according
to the CJEU, are not subject to the limitations enumerated in Article 17(2)(a) and
(b) of Directive 86/653/EEC, which again clearly follows from the systematic
position of Article 17(2)(c) of Directive 86/653/EEC outside of the subparagraphs
determining the preconditions and limitations for indemnities. Furthermore, the
CJEU followed the Advocate General in noting that the harmonizing effect of
Article 17(2) of Directive 86/653/EEC only applies to indemnity for customers, not
to all other potential sources of compensation, be they in contract or tort law.
Quite naturally, however, the simultaneous application of indemnity and da-
mages regimes may not lead to double compensation for a single instance of loss.
Second, the Court inquired into the preconditions the directive erects for the
award of damages. More precisely, it was unclear whether the damage regime
required fault attributable to the principal and a loss distinct from the one covered
by the indemnity regime. Regarding fault, the CJEU held that in the absence of
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concrete specifications of circumstances for damages in the directive, the prere-
quisites are left to the discretion of Member States. These may or may not require
the existence of fault. However, the recovery of damages must relate to losses
distinct from those compensated by the indemnity regime. The CJEU convincingly
pointed out that otherwise the preconditions and limitations of Article 17(2) of
Directive 86/653/EEC could be easily circumvented.
Consumer Protection
Advertising
Labelling concerning Sodium chloride (table salt) or total
amount of sodium in mineral waters: Judgment in Case C-157/14
Neptune Distribution
The case concerns a question at the intersection of chemistry, medicine and the
law. Neptune Distribution sells mineral water which is high in sodium bicarbonate
but low in sodiumchloride. Sodiumchloride is the chemical denomination for table
salt and has been shown to be linked tomedical issues such as arterial tension. The
scientific literature on sodium bicarbonate is more ambiguous with respect to its
negativehealth implications. On its labels, NeptuneDistribution factually correctly
stated that its mineral water mainly contains sodium bicarbonate and is low in salt
(sodium chloride). However, the relevant Regulation1924/2006 on nutrition and
health claims made on foods and Directive 2009/54/EC on the exploitation and
marketing of natural mineral waters do not distinguish between different types of
sodium in their labelling provisions. Therefore, the French health authorities
enjoined Neptune Distribution from including statements on its label that could
lead consumers to believe that its waters were low or very low in salt or sodium,
prohibiting also the statements distinguishing between sodium bicarbonate and
sodium chloride. The appeal of Neptune Distribution against this decision thus
joins a long stringof casesdealingwithpotentiallymisleading labels on foodstuff.2
Against this factual background, the judgment addressed two main ques-
tions.
2 See, eg, P. Hacker, ‘The Behavioral Divide. A Critique of the Differential Application of
Behavioral Law Economics in the EU and the US’ 11 European Review of Contract Law 299, 323–327
(2015), also for the rationality implications inherent in these cases and pertinent regulations.
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First, the CJEU noted that as a matter of positive law, the Annex to Regulation
1924/2006 allows claims that some foodstuff is low in sodium or salt only if the
amount of sodium generally, ie, including both sodium bicarbonate and chloride,
is below a certain threshold. Similarly, the Annex III to Directive 2009/54/EC
permits the indication on mineral waters of being suitable for low-sodium diet
only if (total) sodium content is less than 20 mg/l. Therefore, both norms do not
distinguish between different components of sodium, even though the medical
implications might differ from one to the other. The CJEU reminds us that these
rules are meant to give consumers ‘the necessary information to make choices in
full knowledge of facts’ (para 49).3 It seems ironic that, given this aim, the Court
went on to uphold the decisions by the French health authorities which prevent
the distributor from differentiating between different types of sodium, ie, from
giving more and fuller information to the consumer. Rather, the Court held,
labelling of natural mineral water bottles may only suggest that they are suitable
for low-sodium diet if the total sodium content, aggregating over all chemical
forms, is less than 20 mg/l.
Second, the CJEU responded to the question of the Conseil d’État casting
doubt on the validity of these provisions in the light of the freedom of expression
and the freedom to conduct a business guaranteed under the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. The case thus
presents another instance of the complex interactions of fundamental rights with
provisions governing duties of information owed between private parties. Unsur-
prisingly, however, the Court held that the protection of human health and
consumer protection are legitimate objectives of general interest which may limit
the aforesaid fundamental rights. The CJEU granted broad discretion to the EU
legislature for implementing the principle of proportionality in the present case
since it ‘entails political, economic and social choices on its part, and […] it is
called upon to undertake complex assessments.’ The Court confirmed the propor-
tionality of the EU regulations which help to prevent, in its eyes, misleading
statements by producers. The judgment notes that factually correct but incom-
plete statements (addressing only one of several types of sodium) may mislead
consumers. Moreover, the precautionary principle speaks in favour of including
sodium bicarbonate among the substances potentially damaging to human health
since the scientific evidence is inconclusive about its effects at the moment.
Again, the CJEU in the domain of health thus aimed for a high level of protection
3 For a critique, see P. Hacker, Verhaltensökonomik und Normativität. Die Grenzen des Informa-
tionsmodells im Privatrecht und seine Alternativen (forthcoming); Hacker, n 2 above.
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of consumers, even of those (boundedly rational ones) easily misled by factually
correct but incomplete statements.4
Country of origin labelling concerning footwear: Judgment in
Case C-95/14 Unione Nazionale Industria Conciaria
This judgment presents another instance of labelling, this time, however, of foot-
wear. In order to enhance consumer information and to protect its national
leather industry, Italy had passed a law according to which the materials in
footwear must include a label indicating their country of origin. The question
before the Court therefore was whether such national legislation is compatible
with European legislation on the labelling of footwear.
The CJEU first noted that Directive 94/11 on the labelling of the materials used
in the main components of footwear for sale to the consumer is intended to reduce
trade barriers between Member States. It therefore provides ‘exhaustive harmoni-
zation’ (para 39), not only minimum requirements, concerning the labelling
requirements of footwear. This includes both goods produced in other Member
States and goods produced in Non-Member States but in free circulation within
the EU. Requirements to disclose the country of origin of the goods or materials
the good is made of is not contemplated by the directive. While this alone would
have been sufficient to render the labelling law invalid, the CJEU, more conten-
tiously, took the occasion to make a general point against country of origin
labelling which, in its view, slows down economic exchange and interpenetration
within the EU. It fully neglects, however, potential beneficial effects of country of
origin labelling both for consumers who prefer to shop for local products and, as
a consequence, for the environment at large. In the light of positive law, the
decision is thus straightforward; its wider implications on a general reservations
against country (or, for that matter, region) of origin labelling based solely on its
alleged detrimental effects on economic interpenetration should not be accepted,
however, without further scrutiny.
Display of reference price: Judgment in Case C-13/15 Cdiscount
Unfair trade practices often revolve around concrete formats of price display. In
France, a law prohibited the announcement of price reductions which do not
4 Cf Hacker, n 2 above, 312 with n 62.
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include a reference price enabling consumers to determine by howmuch the price
has been reduced. Such an unreferenced price reduction was undertaken by
Cdiscount, an e-commerce retail store. The French court of appeals referred to the
CJEU the question of whether the French law is compatible with EU legislation,
specifically with Directive 2005/29 on Unfair Commercial Practices (UCP).
The CJEU first analysed whether the purpose of the French law is to protect
consumers, which would bring it under the scope of application of the UCP
directive. It left this question to be answered by the national courts. If the
question is answered in the affirmative, then a price reduction would constitute
a ‘business-to-consumer commercial practice’ in the sense of Article 2(d) of the
UCP directive. This is relevant because the UCP directive provides for full
harmonization of the relevant national regimes on unfair business-to-consumer
commercial practices, preventing Member States from enacting stricter laws to
protect consumers in this domain. The Court found that the French law would
constitute such a precluded stricter type of legislation if, according to the law,
no case-by-case assessment is warranted to assess the unfairness of specific
price reductions. This follows from the distinction, in the UCP directive, between
practices regarded as unfair in all circumstances and those where a case-by-case
assessment is needed. The former are contained in an exhaustive ‘black list’ in
Annex I of the UCP directive, which does not contain unreferenced price reduc-
tions.
Passenger rights and package holiday
Liability of an air carrier in the event of delay in the
international carriage of passengers with contract of
carriage concluded by the passengers’ employer:
Judgment in Case C-429/14 Air Baltic
A Lithuanian government agency purchased flight tickets from Vilnius via Riga
and Moscow to Baku with Air Baltic for two of its agents. The flight from Riga to
Moscow was delayed, causing the agents to miss their connecting flight to Baku.
Therefore, they arrived in Baku one day later. As a result, the Lithuanian govern-
ment agency was compelled, under Lithuanian laws, to pay the agents compensa-
tion in the amount of approximately €338. The agency claimed this amount from
Air Baltic; the carrier alleged that it is liable only to the passengers themselves
and not to their employer.
The CJEU concluded that the case falls within the scope of the Convention for
the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, concluded at
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Montreal on 28 May 1999 (Montreal Convention), which was approved by the
Council on behalf of the EU on 5 April 2001 in its Decision 2001/539/EC and thus
entered into force with respect to the European Union on 28 June 2004. In its
Article 19, the Montreal Convention provides that the ‘carrier is liable for damage
occasioned by delay in the carriage by air of passengers, baggage or cargo.’ The
third recital of the Montreal Convention speaks of the need to ensure the protec-
tion of the interests of consumers in international air carriage; the Court inferred
from the distinction between consumers and passengers that those protected by
the Convention need not necessarily be passengers. Decisively and convincingly,
the Court argued that the basis for compensation flows from the contract con-
cluded between the air carrier and its counterparty, independent of whether that
counterparty is identical with the passenger. Since in the present case the employ-
er concluded the contract, the air carrier was liable to the employer for the delay
caused to the employees as passengers. However, the limitation of the amount of
damages provided for in Art. 22 of the Montreal Convention remained applicable.
Passengers’ rights in the event of delay or cancellation of
a flight and extraordinary circumstances: Judgment in
Case C-257/14 Corina van der Lans
The present case covers one of the key areas of passenger compensation, namely
the question when ‘extraordinary circumstances’ shield air carriers from liability
vis-à-vis their passengers. Ms. van der Lans had purchased a ticket with KLM for a
flight from Quito (Ecuador) to Amsterdam which arrived with a delay of 29 hours,
having departed 34 hours behind schedule. This was caused by a technical
problem discovered during the ‘push back’ on the ground in Quito: one of the
engines failed to start, lacking fuel. KLM acknowledged that two components, the
engine fuel pump and the hydro-mechanical unit, were defective and caused the
engine failure. They had to be flown in from Amsterdam, which caused the long
delay. The defective components, however, had not exceeded their average life-
time; they had last been tested about one month before the flight at issue. KLM
invoked extraordinary circumstances to avoid liability.
The CJEU held that a technical problem which occurs unexpectedly, which is
not attributable to defective maintenance and which was not detected during
regular tests, does not qualify as ‘extraordinary circumstances which could not
have been avoided even if all reasonable measures have been taken’ pursuant to
Article 5(3) of Regulation 261/2004. The Court reiterated that this Article, provid-
ing an exception to the general rule of compensation for passengers, must be
construed strictly. Therefore, in general terms, technical problems are not extra-
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ordinary circumstances since they regularly arise in the course of air travel.
Specific technical problems, however, may qualify as extraordinary circum-
stances, for example the sudden discovery of a hidden manufacturing defect, or
damage to aircraft caused by sabotage and terrorism. The problems at issue did
not fall under these specific, extraordinary problems. They affected only one
particular aircraft, were inherent to the complex operating system of the aircraft,
and were not beyond the actual control of the carrier. Thus, the presence of
extraordinary circumstances was convincingly denied.
Unfair contract terms
Judicial review of standard terms and the enforcement of orders
for payment: Judgement in Case C-49/14 Finanmadrid
This is another decision in the line of cases brought by Spanish courts to the CJEU
that deal with the effects of the Unfair Terms Directive 93/13/EC on enforcement
proceedings (see eg C-618/10 Banco Español de Crédito; C-415/11 Aziz). In the case
at hand, Finanmadrid acquired an order for payment against J.V. Albán Zambra-
no. In the process, the Secretario judicial of the competent court had, as required
by Spanish law, not reviewed the terms of the underlying contract. When Finan-
madrid applied for execution of the order for payment, the Spanish court could,
under national law, not review the contractual terms either since the decision of
the Secretario judicial was an enforceable procedural instrument with the force of
res judicata. The CJEU found that the Unfair Terms Directive precludes such
legislation, i.e. legislation ‘which does not permit the court ruling on the enforce-
ment of an order for payment to assess of its own motion whether a term in a
contract concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer is unfair, when
the authority hearing the application for an order for payment does not have the
power to make such an assessment’. The fact that the addressee of the order for
payment, Albán Zambrano, could have triggered a judicial review of the terms
had he objected to the order for payment in due time did not suffice, according to
the CJEU. The Court convincingly argued that consumers might not lodge the
objection because of the particularly short time (20 days), because of the costs of
legal proceedings, because they are unaware of their rights or because of the
limited content of the application for the order for payment and the limited
amount of information that consumers therefore have. The judgement confirms
and extends the ruling of Case C-618/10 Banco Español de Crédito (a case where a
judge, not a body such as the Secretario judicial, was competent for deciding
upon the order for payment).
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No obligation for notaries to conduct unfair terms review:
Judgement in Case C-32/14 ERSTE Bank Hungary
Again, the procedural implications of the Unfair Terms Directive were at stake.
This time, the question was not whether a court had to review the terms of a
contract but whether the Directive also contained obligations for notaries. The
facts giving rise to this dispute were as follows: ERSTE Bank and Mr Sugár, from
Hungary, concluded a loan agreement and Mr Sugár signed an acknowledge-
ment of debt as a notarised document. When the consumer defaulted on the
payments, the bank requested the affixation of the enforcement clause on the
acknowledgement of debt from the notary. While the notary did check whether
formal requirements were met, he did not, in accordance with Hungarian law,
review the underlying contractual agreements as regards unfair terms. Mr Sugár,
arguing that the contract was unfair, brought an action before the Budapest
Municipal Court, which in turn engaged the CJEU, asking whether it was in
accordance with Article 7 of the Unfair Terms Directive that notaries did not
have to review the unfairness of the contractual terms. Contrary to what might
have been expected after preceding judgements such as Banco Español de
Crédito (and to what the Commission argued), the Court found Hungarian law to
guarantee adequate and effective means to stop the use of unfair terms in
consumer contracts as required by the directive. The CJEU essentially based its
decision on the different functions of judges and notaries and on the sufficient
procedural options that Hungarian law grants to consumers such as Mr Sugár.
The Court acknowledged that consumers might be less vigilant when a notary
drafts a contract since they generally trust his impartiality. Without developing
this argument further, however, the CJEU then pointed to the fact that Hungar-
ian law authorises notaries to verify in the stage of drafting whether contracts
are unfair and to inform the parties if they find them to be so, thus contributing
to the compliance with the requirements laid down in Articles 6(1) and 7(1).
Moreover, the Court stressed that consumers in situations such as Mr Sugár can
challenge the validity of contracts and can initiate court proceedings to exclude
or limit the enforcement under Hungarian law. The mere fact that a consumer
would have to turn to a court and not simply to the notary was not contrary to
the principle of effectiveness. The requirements of the Unfair Terms Directive
did not go so far ‘as to make up fully for the total inertia on the part of the
consumer concerned’, the Court stated. The idea of effective legal protection
was based on the premise that one of the parties brought an action.
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Consumer credit
Foreign currency denominated loan and investment services:
Judgment in Case C-312/14 Banif Plus Bank
The regulatory and contractual framework for financial services contracts is
primarily determined by the directives applicable to the concrete transactions at
issue. For MiFID I to apply, the transaction must qualify as an investment service
or activity. This is what the present case deals with.
Mr Lantos concluded a consumer credit agreement with Banif Plus Bank to
buy a car. The particularity of the loan was its denomination in a foreign currency,
coupled with elements at first glance akin to a currency swap. It involved three
steps: first, the bank calculated the amount in foreign currency equivalent to the
amount that it had to advance in Hungarian forints, but using the exchange rate
of a previously determined date. Second, the bank purchased this exact amount
in foreign currency from the client based on the actual exchange rate applicable
at the time of the advance of the loan and paid the ‘real equivalent’ amount in
Hungarian forints to the client. Third, at the time of repayment, the client bought
from the bank the foreign currency in exchange for forints, based on the actual
exchange rate applicable at that time. The client had to repay the loan in the
foreign currency. Economically, the reason for this arrangement seems to have
been for the client to get access to a lower interest rate (in the foreign currency) in
exchange for assuming the risk of foreign currency appreciation. The question
before the CJEU was whether this loan agreement constituted an investment
service or activity.
The Court observed first that investment services or activities pursuant to
Article 4(1)(2) of MiFID I include only the services or activities listed in Section A
of Annex I which relate to any of the instruments listed in Section C of that annex.
However, the currency exchange contemplated in the loan agreement does not
fall under any of the activities listed in Section A since it is, in the eyes of the
Court, ‘entirely incidental to the granting and repayment of a foreign currency
denominated consumer loan’ (para 55). In that context, the currency exchange
only converts the amounts of the loan and of monthly instalments from foreign
currency into domestic currency since payment obligations have to be met in
foreign currency but payments are actually made in domestic currency. The Court
noted that under these conditions the currency exchange ‘serve[s] no other func-
tion than to be the manner of performing the fundamental payment obligations
under the loan agreement’ (para 57).
Furthermore, the exchange was linked to a transaction which constitutes a
consumer loan, not a financial instrument as defined in Article 4(1)(17) of MiFID I,
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which in turn refers to Section C of Annex I. Specifically, the transaction was not a
future since no underlying financial asset was sold, and since the value of the
amount of the loan and of the repayment instalments were not fixed in advance
but rather calculated on the basis of current exchange rates. Therefore, in sum,
the foreign currency denominated consumer loan did not constitute a financial
service or activity within the meaning of Article 4(1)(2) of MiFID I.
Lawyers as consumers: Judgment in Case C-110/14 Costea
As the previous case reported, the present case deals with a precondition for the
applicability of a certain regulatory framework for consumer loans, but this time
not regarding MiFID I but the Unfair Terms Directive. Mr Costea is a lawyer
specializing in the field of commercial law. He concluded a credit contract with
Volksbank in April 2008 the purpose of which was not specified and the repay-
ment of which was secured by a mortgage registered against the building belong-
ing to his law firm. The agreement was signed by Mr Costea both in his capacity as
a borrower and as the representative of his law firm with respect to the mortgage.
Later, Mr Costea sought a declaratory judgment confirming that a contractual
term concerning a ‘risk charge’was unfair and invalid.
The CJEU observed that for the Unfair Terms Directive to be applicable, Mr
Costea must have acted as a consumer within the meaning of Article 2(b) of that
directive. This implies that he must have acted for purposes which are outside his
trade, business or profession. The Court noted that this concept is an objective
one and thus independent from the knowledge or information the acting person
actually has. For the concrete determination of the status of the lawyer, the Court
proceeded in two steps. First, it followed the Advocate General in holding that the
nature of the security, ie, the mortgage on the law firm’s property, is irrelevant for
the determination of the status of the lawyer vis-à-vis the loan itself. This is
convincing since indeed assets belonging to the professional sphere of a client
may be used to secure loans which he takes out for purely private purposes. If at
all, the question is whether the client has authority to pledge such professional
assets as collateral for his private undertakings; this, however, is a different issue
independent of his status as a consumer. Second, a lawyer may, despite his great
technical expertise in the formation of contracts, be deemed a consumer if and
only if the concrete contract at issue does not relate to his profession. The Court
noted that there is an inequality between regular ‘client-consumers’ and lawyers.
However, it argued that the lawyer is still in a weaker position vis-à-vis the seller/
supplier when the contract does not relate to his profession in two ways: (i) the
lawyer may not have expertise with respect to that particular contract, in contrast
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to the seller/supplier; (ii) he lacks bargaining power since he is unable to influ-
ence the terms of the contract. This analysis is incomplete in both prongs.
Depending on the concrete contract, the lawyer may have considerable expertise,
given his professional formation, even if the concrete contract is not concluded
for purposes of his profession. Moreover, lack of bargaining power should not be
equated with impossibility to influence the concrete terms of the contract, but
chiefly depends on the alternatives the lawyer has, which in turn is defined by the
market structure, the lawyer’s search costs etc. in the concrete case. All in all, the
judgment testifies to the tension between a rigid system of categorization based
on status (consumer or not consumer) and significant heterogeneity, with respect
to knowledge, bargaining power etc., within these status groups. As a matter of
positive law, however, the upshot of the judgment is that a lawyer may or may not
be considered a consumer, depending on whether he acts for purposes outside of
his profession are not.
Contracts of guarantee or providing security concluded with
a credit institution by natural persons acting for purposes
outside their trade, business or profession: Judgment in
Case C-74/15 Tarcău
The next case again deals with the concept of ‘consumer’. A bank lent money to a
commercial companyunder a credit agreement.At a later point, in order to increase
the credit line of the commercial company, two security contracts were concluded
between the bank and two natural persons, the parents of the sole shareholder and
director of the commercial company. The parents claimed that they only wanted to
help their son and hence signed a guarantee of the repayment of the loans as well
as a mortgage agreement relating to immovable property they owned. Later, they
challenged some clauses of these security agreements as unfair.
The CJEU distinguished the Unfair Terms Directive from Directive 87/102/EEC
on consumer credit insofar as contracts of guarantee are excluded only from the
scope of the latter, not of the former directive. Rather, the applicability of the
former turns on whether the parents had acted in their capacity as consumers.
The Court convincingly argued that despite the security contracts being ancillary
to the loan agreement, they constitute separate contracts with parties different
from those of the loan agreement. Therefore, the status of the parents in signing
these security contracts must be analyzed separately. Hence, they may be deemed
consumers if they acted for purposes of a private nature and have no links of a
functional nature with the commercial company, such as a directorship or owner-
ship of a non-negligible amount of shares.
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Competition law, Public procurement and
State regulation
Common computerised booking system as a concerted
practice: Judgment in Case C-74/14 Eturas
The case presents an intriguing pattern taken from the digital world of commerce.
A number of independent travel agencies used a common program (E-TURAS)
administrated by the company owning the copyright on the program. E-TURAS
could be used to offer travel packages and other travel services online. In August
2009, the administrator of E-TURAS sent a message to participating companies in
which he announced that discount rates for travel packages would henceforth be
technically capped at 3%. After the technical change was implemented, it was
still possible but technically more complicated for the agencies to offer discounts
in excess of 3%. Some of the agencies, however, claim not to have read the
message or not to have offered any travel services via E-TURAS after the cap was
implemented. Nevertheless, the Lithuanian Competition Council found that all
agencies that did not actively object to the cap were tacitly engaging in a
concerted anticompetitive practice. Two agencies challenged this decision.
The CJEU started by noting that even passive modes of participation in
infringements, such as the mere presence in meetings at which anticompetitive
agreements are concluded, renders an undertaking liable under Article 101 TFEU.
The burden of proof regarding tacit approval of anticompetitive initiatives rests
with the party or authority alleging the infringement, Article 2 of Regulation 1/
2003, in this case the Lithuanian Competition Council. The Regulation, however,
is silent on the standard of proof and on specific assessments of evidence. There-
fore, these must be established by the respective national legal orders, taking
account of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. The latter, however,
demands that concerted practices may also be proven by indirect evidence or
indicia. In the concrete case, this meant that involvement in the concerted
practice may be inferred for those agencies that indeed were aware of the message
sent by the administrator, unless that presumption is rebutted by an objection of
the travel agency, eg by a message to the E-TURAS administrator, by public
distancing, or by reporting the message to the administrative authorities. The
mere reception of the message announcing the cap, however, did not suffice to
establish the participation in a concerted practice in the light of the presumption
of innocence applicable in competition law proceedings.
154 Philipp Hacker and Max Fabian Starke
‘Veto clause’ in commercial lease agreements for shopping
centres: Judgment in Case C-345/14Maxima Latvija
A large Latvian business entity, Maxima Latvija, which operates shops and
hypermarkets, concluded a series of commercial lease agreements with shopping
centres to rent commercial premises. 12 of the 119 analyzed contracts contained a
‘veto clause’ conferring on Maxima Latvija the right to object to lease agreements
between the shopping centres and other potential lessees. The Latvian Competi-
tion Council concluded that in view of the market power held by Maxima Latvija,
the clauses were purposefully anticompetitive and infringed Latvian competition
law even though the Competition Council did not establish that they in fact
rendered the entry of a particular lessee onto the market difficult.
Against this background, the CJEU addressed two questions: whether the veto
clauses potentially amount to a restriction of competition by object or to a
restriction of competition by effect.
The CJEU reiterated first that the concept of restriction of competition ‘by
object’, Article 101(1) TFEU, must be interpreted restrictively. The agreement must
reveal ‘in itself a sufficient degree of harm to competition for it to be considered
that is not appropriate to assess its effects’ (para. 20). This condition was not met
by the veto clauses according to the CJEU since they did not imply clearly the
restriction of competition by their very nature.
However, second, the veto clauses may have an actual or potential antic-
ompetitive effect if they foreclose access to the local retail food markets. The most
relevant factors for the economic and legal analysis of the effects are the position
of the contracting parties on the relevant market, the duration of the agreement,
and the possibility of competitors to seek leases in alternative shopping centres.
Retroactive rebate scheme: Judgment in Case C-23/14 Post
Danmark
The next case concerns an all-time classic in competition law: rebate schemes.
The scheme under review was operated by Post Danmark from 2003 on, at a time
when it had a monopoly on the market for distribution of bulk mail. The rebates
were offered to customers sending out at least 3000 copies of advertising mail at a
time, and in aggregate batches of at least 30,000 letters per year or representing
an annual gross postage value of at least 300,000 Danish crowns (approximately
€40,200). The rebate rates were applied on a scale from 6 to 16%, with larger
rebates being offered to customers sending more items of mail or mail with a
greater value per year. The same conditions applied to all customers. The prices
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for mail items were tentatively determined at the beginning of each year based on
an estimate of the total expected amount of mail sent by each customer. The final
price, including the final rebate, was applied retroactively at the end of the year
based on the actual number and value of items sent. In 2007, Bring Citymail
Danmark entered the market of bulk mail as the only serious competitor. In 2010,
it withdrew from the market after heavy losses. The rebate system of Post Dan-
mark had continued in 2007 and 2008, at a time when 70% of all bulk mail in
Danmark was covered by its monopoly. The Danish competition authority con-
cluded that the scheme resulted in an anticompetitive exclusionary effect on the
market pursuant to Article 82 EC, ruling out the ‘as-efficient-competitor’ test
championed by Post Danmark.
Against this background, the Court addressed three main questions: the
competitive effects of the rebate scheme at issue, the role of the ‘as-efficient-
competitor’ test, and the necessary degree of likelihood of anticompetitive effects.
The CJEU started by reiterating its distinction between quantity discounts,
which in principle do not infringe Article 82 EC, and loyalty discounts, which are
deemed an abuse of a dominant position. The rebate scheme under review
represented neither a clear quantity discount since it applied to an aggregation of
orders over a year nor a clear loyalty discount since it lacked arrangements for
clients to purchase a given proportion of their supplies from Post Danmark. The
assessment of the rebate scheme must consider all circumstances, but particu-
larly: whether there is an objective economic justification for the discounts; that
retroactive discounts tend to exert strong pressure on those to whom they are
offered; that the scheme indiscriminately applied to monopolized and un-mono-
polized services; and finally that two thirds of un-monopolized direct advertising
mail could not be transferred from Post Danmark to its competitor without an
adverse impact on the scale of the rebates, significantly limiting clients’ freedom
of choice. In conjunction with the very large market share of Post Danmark (95%),
the Court concluded that the rebate scheme at issue produced an anticompetitive
exclusionary effect. The fact that the rebate scheme is applied to a large proportion
of customers in the relevant market increased the likelihood of such an effect.
Next, the CJEU held that the ‘as-efficient-competitor’ test was irrelevant for
the determination of the legality of the rebate scheme. The test analyzes whether
the pricing practices of the dominant undertaking could drive an equally efficient
competitor from the market by comparing prices to costs. It has been used by the
Court in a number of cases involving pricing schemes (mostly selective or pre-
datory prices and margin squeeze). The test, however, is not a necessary compo-
nent of the assessment of a rebate scheme, and it was irrelevant in the present
case since the emergence of an as-efficient competitor was practically impossible
due to the monopolized structure of the market.
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Finally, the Court found that the anticompetitive effect must not be purely
hypothetical, but probable. However, it need not be serious or appreciable, ie, it
need not surpass a de minimis threshold, since competition on the market is
already weakened in the presence of a dominant undertaking.
Arrangement for sharing clients on a private pension fund
market: Judgment in Case C- 172/14 ING Pensii
The next case addresses a practice which comes close to hard-core restrictions
of competition: arrangements for sharing clients. ING Pensii administered a
private pension fund in Romania. In September 2010, the Romanian competition
authority imposed fines on ING Pensii and 13 other private pension fund mana-
ging companies for agreements to share clients between those companies. These
agreements dealt with clients which signed two different private pension fund
affiliation applications during an initial affiliation period (so called ‘duplica-
tions’). According to the agreements, the pension funds shared these duplica-
tions equally between them in order to avoid the allocation of these persons by
the supervisory authority. The statutory provisions provided that duplications
were regarded as not validly affiliated and had to be allocated among the funds
in direct proportion to the number of persons whose affiliation had been
validated.
The CJEU, as in the ‘veto clause’ caseMaxima Latvija reported above, recalled
the distinction between agreements or concerted practices with ‘anticompetitive
object’ and those with ‘anticompetitive effect’. Customer sharing agreements
according to the Court clearly form part of the category of the most serious
restrictions of competition and thus fall under the first alternative of ‘anticompe-
titive object’. The agreement at issue, the Court found, served to ‘affiliate the
persons concerned to limited group of operators, contrary to the statutory rules
applicable, and thus to the detriment of other companies operating in the
economic sector concerned in the main proceedings’ (para 32). The client sharing
agreement served as a vehicle for private pension funds to mould the functioning
of the newly established obligatory private insurance market at a ‘key stage in the
formation of that market’ (para 47). Lastly, the anticompetitive nature of such an
agreement does not depend on the actual number of clients shared between
companies since its very object is to restrict competition.
General Law of Contract and Obligations 157
Patent essential to a standard and FRAND licences: Judgment in
Case C-170/13 Huawei Technologies
The final case again highlights the complex interactions between IP and competi-
tion law. Huawei Technologies holds a European patent which is essential to the
‘long term evolution’ (LTE) standard, a technological standard for high-speed
data transfer for mobile phones. Huawei notified the European Telecommunica-
tions Standards Institute (ETSI) in March 2009 of the patent and undertook to
grant licenses to third parties on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory
(FRAND) terms. ZTE Corporation markets products which use the LTE standard
without a license agreement with Huawei. Between November 2010 and the end
of March 2011, the two companies discussed the possibility of concluding a
license on FRAND terms. Huawei notified ZTE of an amount it considered a
reasonable royalty; ZTE requested a cross-licensing agreement; a licensing agree-
ment was never finalized, however. In April 2011, Huawei sued ZTE in a German
court for patent infringement. The German court considered that the action
brought by Huawei might constitute an abuse of a dominant position.
The CJEU first recalled that the exercise of an intellectual property right by
the proprietor can only be deemed abusive conduct in exceptional circumstances.
Patents essential to a technological standard (SEPs), however, present a special
case since they govern the point of entry to the entire range of products using the
standard in question. Therefore, undertakings to unconditionally grant FRAND
licenses are used to mitigate concerns over restriction of competition. In such
circumstances a refusal to grant a license by the proprietor of the SEP is in
principle tantamount to an abuse of a dominant position. The specific problem of
the case in the main proceedings was that the parties disagreed about what
FRAND terms were, particularly about the amount of royalty to be paid. The CJEU
ruled that in such a situation, ‘the proprietor of an SEP must comply with
conditions which seek to ensure a fair balance between the interests concerned’
(para 55).
To avoid an abuse of a dominant position, the proprietor must therefore, first,
notify the alleged infringer before bringing an action for patent infringement,
even if the SEP has already been used by the alleged infringer. The notice must
designate the SEP and specify the infringement. Second, if the alleged infringer is
willing to conclude the licensing agreement on FRAND terms, the proprietor of
the SEP must make a specific, written offer for such a license including the
amount of the royalty and the method of its calculation. The alleged infringer, in
turn, must then diligently respond to that offer, taking account of recognized
commercial practices in the field and in good faith; delaying tactics are impermis-
sible in the situation. If it does not accept the offer, the alleged infringer must
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make a written, specific and prompt counteroffer in accordance with FRAND
terms. If the counteroffer, in turn, is rejected, the alleged infringer must provide
appropriate security, for example a bank guarantee, if it intends to continue to
use the teachings of the SEP in the absence of a finalized licensing agreement. It
must also be able to render an account relating to the acts of use of the teachings
of the patent. The Court furthermore notes that the parties may, by common
agreement, request the determination of the amount of the royalty by an indepen-
dent third party. Finally, the alleged infringer is free to challenge the validity of
the SEP even while negotiating the terms of the license.
All in all, the case shows the willingness of the CJEU to resolve the tensions
between IP and competition law by recourse to fine-grained procedural rules
designed to ensure a fair balance of the interests of the involved parties.
Employment Law
Travelling time between home and customers as working time:
Judgement in Case C-266/14 Tyco
Tyco, a Spanish company, ran a business that consisted in installing and main-
taining security systems. Its technicians had a geographical area assigned to
them, where they were to travel to private homes and industrial and commercial
premises in company vehicles to install and maintain security equipment. Tyco
set the sequence and times of consumer appointments. It did neither count the
time between the workers’ homes and the first customer of the day nor the time
between the last customer of the day and the workers’ return home as working
time. The distances covered in those instances varied greatly and could some-
times exceed 100 kilometres and, in one example named, three hours. The CJEU
found that the time spans in question did, however, fall under the meaning of
working time of point 1 of Article 2 of the Working Time Directive 2003/88/EC. All
three requirements of this provision were met: the technicians were working, were
at the employer’s disposal and carrying out their activity or duties. The Court first
confirmed earlier judgements, where it had found, inter alia, that provisions on
working time constitute rules of EU social law of particular importance, which are
necessary to ensure protection of safety and health of workers, and that the
concepts of working time and rest periods are mutually exclusive with no inter-
mediate category in between. Against this backdrop, the CJEU then went on to test
the three named requirements. As regards the condition that the worker must be
carrying out his activity or duties, the Court rejected Tyco’s argument that the
workers’ duties merely entail providing technical services, installing and main-
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taining security systems to those customers. On the contrary, it stated that travel-
ling to customers is a necessary means of providing those services. It would
‘distort’ the concepts of working time and ‘jeopardise the objective of protecting
the safety and health of workers’ to exclude those periods. The CJEU then found
that Tyco’s workers were also at the disposal of their employer while travelling to
and from customers since the employer determined and could change the order of
the customers or cancel or add an appointment and since workers were ‘not able
to use their time freely and pursue their own interests’. The danger of abuse, such
as the conduct of personal business on the way, could not influence the legal
classification of journey time, the Court argued. Rather, it would be on Tyco to
introduce necessary monitoring procedures to prevent abuse. Finally, the Court
also saw the requirement according to which the worker must be working as
fulfilled. Like the Advocate General it argued, ‘given that travelling is an integral
part of being a worker without a fixed or habitual place of work, the place of work
of such workers cannot be reduced to the physical areas of their work on the
premises of their employer’s customers’. To find otherwise would be contrary to
the objective of protecting the safety and health of workers.
Interpretation of ‘transfer of a business’ and obligation to make
request for a preliminary ruling: Judgement in Case C-160/14
Ferreira
A case that had its origins in 1993 led to a judgement by the CJEU on 9 September
2015. Back in 1993, a Portuguese charter airline named Air Atlantis (AIA) was
wound up. Most of the employees were dismissed. AIA’s main shareholder, TAP,
began to operate some of the flights that AIA had contracted to, used some of
AIA’s assets, among them four aeroplanes, assumed responsibility for some
payments and took over AIA’s office equipment as well as a number of former AIA
employees. Dismissed employees brought an action against the collective redun-
dancy, seeking reinstatement within TAP and payment of their remuneration.
After lengthy proceedings and two appeals, the Portuguese Supremo Tribunal de
Justiça decided in 2009 that the collective redundancy was lawful, thus contra-
dicting the lower courts, which had held that there was at least a partial transfer
of business. During the trial, the Supremo Tribunal de Justiça refused to make a
reference to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. It argued that the CJEU’s adjudica-
tion on the term ‘transfer of a business’ of Article 1(1) of the Transfer of Under-
takings Directive 2001/23/EC left no material doubt as to interpretation of the
provision. Former employees of AIA then sued the Portuguese State for damages,
arguing that this decision was manifestly unlawful. This time, the court called
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upon did make a request for a preliminary ruling. The CJEU not only held that the
concept of a ‘transfer of a business’ in the meaning of Article 1(1) of Directive
2001/23/EC encompasses a situation such as the one sketched above. It also
found the Supremo Tribunal de Justiça had been obliged to make a reference to
the Court. Regarding the first finding, the CJEU stated that in the air transport
sector the transfer of tangible assets is a key factor. When TAP took over the
aeroplanes, it took over essential assets. The Court also found it important that
TAP replaced AIA in the ongoing charter flight contracts and that a link remained
between the assets and the employees that were taken over to occupy identical
positions. This, in the view of the Court, amounted to a ‘retention of the functional
link of interdependence and complementarity’ between the elements of produc-
tion taken over. Regarding the obligation for a preliminary reference, it must first
be noted that the Supremo Tribunal de Justiça was a court against whose
decisions there was no judicial remedy under national law. It was therefore
obliged to bring the matter before the CJEU according to Article 267 TFEU, unless
the application of EU law was so obvious as to leave no scope for reasonable
doubt. Contradictory decisions by national courts, the Court stated, do not in
themselves mean that there is necessarily reasonable doubt. However, taken
together with the difficulties that frequently arise in interpreting the term of
transfer of a business, they did give rise to an obligation to make a reference to
the Court. Interestingly, the upshot from this decision appears to be this: When a
national court of last instance wants to diverge from a lower court’s decision that
interprets EU law, it has to ask the CJEU first if the interpretation is difficult. This,
it seems, would rather be the rule than the exception whenever two courts come
to diverging conclusions.
Scope of the Transfer of Undertakings Directive: Judgement in
Case C-509/14 ADIF
The CJEU decided that the scope of the Transfer of Undertakings Directive covers
a situation such as the following: ADIF, a public undertaking, handled intermodal
transport units at the train terminal of Bilbao. It outsourced the management to
the company Algeposa for several years. Algeposa provided its service in ADIF’s
facilities, using ADIF’s cranes. When the agreement between ADIF and Algeposa
terminated, ADIF went back to providing the services with its own staff again.
Algeposa collectively dismissed several workers for economic reasons. Neither
the fact that the transferee was a public-law body nor the fact that it took back the
business it had once pursued excluded the application of the Transfer of Under-
takings Directive, according to the CJEU. As regards the issue whether a transfer
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of business had occurred in the particular case, the Court did not give a conclu-
sive answer but left this to the national court. It stressed, however, that handling
intermodal transport units heavily relies on equipment and is not essentially
based on manpower, thus opening up the route for finding that a transfer of
business had taken place. As the Court had decided in an earlier case (C-340/01
Abler), in such situations there may still be a transfer of a business even if the new
contractor does not take over an essential part of the staff.
Leave
Calculation of entitlement to paid annual leave in the event
of an increase in working time: Judgement in Case C-219/14
Greenfield
Calculating the duration of the entitlement to leave becomes tricky when work-
ing hours change. In an earlier judgement, the CJEU had already decided on the
calculation in case working hours decrease (C-415/12 Brandes). Now, the Bir-
mingham Employment Tribunal handed the Court the opportunity to rule on the
inverse case. The facts of the main proceedings were these: Under the contract
of employment between Kathleen Greenfield and Care Bureau, Ms Greenfield
was entitled to 5.6 weeks of leave per year. She worked for one day per week
between April and June 2012. In June and July 2012, she took seven days of paid
annual leave. In August 2012, she increased her working hours to an average of
41.4 hours per week. When Ms Greenfield asked for a week of paid leave in
November 2012, Care Bureau replied that through the seven days of leave she
took in the summer, she had exhausted her entitlement to paid annual leave.
Care Bureau argued that under national law, entitlement to paid leave was
calculated at the date on which leave was taken, based on the working pattern
for the 12-week period prior to the leave. The Birmingham Employment Tribunal
wanted to know, inter alia, whether clause 4.2 of the Framework Agreement on
part-time work and Article 7 of the Working Time Directive either require or
prohibit that paid annual leave already accrued be recalculated retroactively in
case of an increase in working hours. The Court held that EU law does not
require this. It stated that in case of changing working hours it was necessary to
calculate ‘the number of units of annual leave accumulated in relation to the
number of units worked’ for each period separately. Also, the pro rata temporis
principle from clause 4.2 of above named Framework Agreement could not be
applied ex post. What EU law did require, though, was to make a new calcula-
tion for the period during which the working time is increased. More precisely,
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for a situation such as Ms Greenfield’s, EU law required first such a new
calculation and then to deduct the units of annual leave taken during part-time
that exceeded the right to paid annual leave accumulated during that period
from the newly accumulated rights. While these are the minimum requirements
of the Working Time Directive, the Court also held that Member States are not
precluded from adopting provisions more favourable to workers and to recalcu-
late the entitlement to paid annual leave as requested by Ms Greenfield. As
regards another question of the preliminary reference, the CJEU also decided
that for the calculation it does not matter whether the employment relationship
is terminated or whether it continues.
Discrimination
No requirement of punitive damages: Judgement in Case C-407/
14 Arjona Camacho
Article 18 of Directive 2006/54/EC requires Member States to ensure ‘real and
effective compensation or reparation’ for damages that someone sustains as a
result of discrimination of grounds of sex. This has to happen, it is also specified
in this provision, in a way that is ‘dissuasive and proportionate’. The Social Court
No 1 of Córdoba wondered whether this might require Member States to introduce
punitive damages. In Spanish law, punitive damages did not exist. The CJEU
found that Directive 2006/54/EC does allow Member States to introduce punitive
damages but it does not require them. The Court noted that Article 18 of the
Directive 2006/54/EC reproduces the wording of Article 6(2) of Directive 76/207,
as amended by Directive 2002/73. Regarding the earlier provision, the Court had
found that Member States’measures have to have a genuine deterrent effect (Case
C-271/91 Marshall) but they do not have include punitive damages, ie damages
that go beyond full compensation for a loss. The Court agreed with the Advocate
General that there has been no substantive change in EU law which might require
a different interpretation of the new provision. The CJEU added that Article 25 of
the same directive does not require punitive damages either but does allow
Member States to introduce them. To make its point clear, the Court concluded
that in a legal order such as the Spanish one ‘Article 25 of Directive 2006/54/EC
does not provide that a national court can on its own require the person respon-
sible for the discrimination to pay such damages’. Had the Court found that a
provision of EU law required punitive damages, this would have had implications
far beyond the Articles in question. The decision at hand refrains from provoking
clashes with traditional principles of civil law.
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Different treatment of young people working during
their school holidays or university vacations: Judgement in
Case C-432/14 Bio Philippe Auguste
Under French law, young persons who work during their school holidays or
university vacations are treated differently from other employees. They are not
entitled to an insecurity payment that is payable if a fixed-term contract is not
followed by an offer of permanent employment. A French student who worked
for four days during his university vacation and who did not receive the end-of-
contract-payment sued his employer before the Labour Tribunal of Paris. Just as
in the well-known Mangold case (C-144/04), the legal conflict was staged solely
to challenge the provisions at issue. As in that case, the CJEU still answered
the questions it was asked by the national court, arguing that it was not a
fictitious dispute, that the employment contract had been performed and that
its application raised a question of EU law. Other than in Mangold, however, the
Court did not find the relevant provision of national law to be precluded by EU
law. In its judgement, the CJEU interpreted the principle of non-discrimination
on grounds of age, as ‘enshrined in Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union and given specific expression by Directive 2000/
78/EC’. This hybrid construction of legal sources is well established in the
Courts adjudication on anti-discrimination matters (see eg Mangold, Case C-555/
07 Kücükdeveci and Case C-476/11 HK Danmark) and enables the Court to make
EU law directly applicable in cases between private individuals. The CJEU first
questioned whether someone who only works for four days may be a worker in
the meaning of Directive 2000/78/EC. While it expressed doubts, it left this to
the national court to decide. It then went on to consider whether the French
provision in question amounted to discrimination. The Court found that it did
not as the situation of students was not comparable to that of workers who
were entitled to end-of-contract-payment. Since they were to go back to school
and university after their employment, they were not in a situation of job
insecurity. Their employment was both temporary and ancillary, the Court
argued.
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Private International and International Procedural
Law
Applicable law in actions for indemnity between insurers of
tractor units and trailers: Judgement in Joined Cases C-359/14
and 475/14 ERGO/P&C
This decision on the Rome Regulations concerns the borders between contractual
and non-contractual liability in EU law. In both of the joined cases, lorries were
involved in road traffic accidents in Germany. In both cases, the tractor unit was
insured by a different insurer than the trailer. The insurers of the tractor units paid
the victims of the accidents compensation and then sought reimbursement from
the insurers of the trailers. Since the insurers were not German but Latvian, the
question arose which law was applicable to their relationship. The Court first
considered whether Directive 2009/13/EC might have something to say on the
matter since it dealt with measures guaranteeing protections to the victims of
road accidents. However, the Court quickly found that this directive does not lay
down conflict-of-law rules. It then turned to the Rome Regulations and to their
respective scopes of contractual and non-contractual liability, arguing as follows:
For a start, there are contractual relations between the insurer and the respective
owners of the tractors and trailer but not between the insurers. Therefore, the very
claim of one insurer against the other cannot be inferred from the insurance
contracts themselves but is based on the premise that both the owner of the
tractor unit and the trailer are liable to the victims of the road accidents. Such
obligations of the owners are of a non-contractual kind in the meaning of Article 1
of the Rome II Regulation. Pursuant to Article 4 of the Rome II Regulation, the
applicable law is therefore that of the country in which the damage directly
resulting from the accident is suffered, ie in the present cases Germany. As
regards the insurers, however, their liability towards the victims only arose
because of the respective insurance contracts with the insured parties who were
liable. The law applicable to those contracts is governed by Article 7 of the Rome I
Regulation. For the classification of the relationship between the insurers, now,
Article 19 of the Rome I Regulation is decisive. This provision deals with subroga-
tion and stipulates that the law that governs the obligation of the third party (in
the cases at hand: the insurers) also governs the subrogation of the victim’s rights.
Since the insurers’ obligations arise in the Courts’ view from the insurance
contracts, the conditions under which the insurer may exercise the rights of the
victims also depend on the national law that is applicable according to Article 7
Rome I Regulation. Still, the law that determines the persons who may be held
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liable for the consequences of the road accident and the allocation of responsi-
bility between them remains subject to Article 4 of the Rome II Regulation. There-
fore, the Court concluded that the law applicable to an action for indemnity in
cases such as the ones at hand ‘is to be determined in accordance with Article 7 of
the Rome I Regulation if the rules of liability in tort, delict and quasi-delict
applicable to that accident by virtue of Article 4 et seq of the Rome II Regulation
provide for apportionment of the obligation to compensate for the damage’.
Note: The primary responsibility for the areas of General Law of Contract and Obligations,
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